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INTRODUCTION 
Organizational research on individual creativity has expanded rapidly in the last decade. Initially 
focused on the individual traits presumed to affect creativity (Sternberg, 1985; Tardif and 
Sternberg, 1988), over the years this research has concentrated more squarely on the role of 
social interactions and social facets of the environment (Amabile, 1988; Woodman, Sawyer and 
Griffin, 1993; Glynn, 1996). Building on social-psychologists’ key idea “that the creative 
individual be placed within a network of interpersonal relationships” (Simonton, 1984: 1273), 
organizational scholars interested in the social side of creativity recently have begun to 
incorporate social network concepts into their models and explanations of the determinants of 
individual creativity to gain deeper understanding of how creative work is generated (Perry-
Smith and Shalley, 2003; Burt, 2004; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005).  
 These studies have shown how the adoption of a social network perspective is fruitful in 
informing creativity literature and thus enhancing our understanding of creativity at work. Yet, 
by focusing mainly on structural explanations of creativity, this research has left largely 
underexplored another key dimension of creativity: the need for field legitimation, i.e., the 
process by which the new and unaccepted is rendered valid and accepted through field consensus 
(Zelditch, 2001; Johnson, Dowd and Ridgeway, 2006). We seek to fill this gap by integrating 
established sociological perspectives on creativity that emphasize how creativity is embedded in 
networks of social relationships and support (Csikszentmihályi, 1994, 1996; Uzzi and Spiro, 
2005) with recent research on legitimacy that uses an audience-candidate interface framework 
(Zuckerman, 1999; Zuckerman, Kim, Ukanwa and von Rittman, 2003, Cattani, Ferriani, Negro 
and Perretti, 2008). The framework we advance explains audiences’ (henceforth evaluators) 
rewarding of candidates’ (henceforth agents) creative work as a function of candidates’ 
positioning within the social structure of their field, as well as of the type of audience under 
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consideration. In particular, we suggest that evaluators who are industry peers —i.e., members 
who occupy the same social position within the field as the agents they evaluate, and therefore 
may compete for the same material and symbolic resources—tend to reproduce dominant social 
beliefs and norms. As a result, they are more likely to grant recognition to agents who are ‘core’ 
rather than ‘peripheral’ members of the network. This socio-structural ordering of creativity, 
whereby disproportionate benefits accrue to highly embedded agents, makes it especially hard 
for peripheral agents to gain peer evaluators’ attention, thus reducing the chance that their 
creative work will be legitimated. By accentuating inequalities in status, resources, and 
opportunities between core and peripheral agents, a socio-structural ordering of creativity 
resonates with the so-called “Matthew effect” in science, which shows how recognition for 
scientific work tends to be skewed in favor of established scientists (Merton, 1968).  
We explore these ideas within the context of the Hollywood motion picture industry, 
which we traced over the period 1992-2004. This industry provides an ideal context for testing 
the implications from our theoretical framework. First, the industry has long embraced 
arrangements featuring flexible and short-term relationships that rely on enduring networks, in 
which mutual trust and reputations have been cemented over time (Faulkner and Anderson, 
1987). Second, the industry grants systematic recognition to its members for their creative 
achievements through a large number of organizations that bestow awards on those seen as 
having made significant contributions to the field (Simonton, 2004a; Gemser, Leenders and 
Wijnberg, 2008). In particular, in this study we consider industry ‘peers’ as the focal audience of 
evaluators. Third, creativity is central to the film production process since each movie is a unique 
product whose completion requires the sustained collaboration of several individuals (Simonton, 
2004b).  
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Social Structure and Rewards 
The relationship between institutional norms and standards and how creativity becomes manifest 
is central to our explanation of why and how we should expect evaluators’ attributions of 
creativity to map onto the social networks of the field. In this paper we refer in particular to the 
degree of socio-structural embeddedness, because agents who are deeply embedded in their 
social system are more likely to conform to those norms that characterize their area of expertise, 
and thus reproduce ideas or styles currently deemed acceptable. As Jones and colleagues (1997: 
929) pointed out: “The more structurally embedded (e.g., the more connected and frequently 
interacting) the industry participants, the more deeply they share their values, assumptions and 
role understandings.” Strong structural embeddedness also makes deviance from existing norms 
and standards harder to hide and, therefore, more likely to be punished (Granovetter, 1985). In 
contrast, agents who are less deeply embedded, and not subject to such strong assimilative 
pressures, are freer to pursue divergent ideas (White, 1993). 
The core-periphery imagery provides an intuitive and evocative illustration of this socio-
structural trade-off between demands for conformity and freedom to diverge (Cattani and 
Ferriani, 2008). Insofar as individual agents remain peripheral to their social field they can more 
easily attend to fresh new ideas, knowledge and perspectives without the anxiety of clashing with 
the field’s accepted rules (Perry-Smith and Shalley, 2003) – which in turn results in radically 
new solutions (i.e., technologies, theories, practices, etc.) often being pioneered at the fringe or 
periphery of a given social field (Leblebici et al., 1991).1 However, insulation from conformity 
                                                 
1
 On this point the famous abstract Italian painter Giorgio Morandi once said: “When most Italian artists of my 
generation were afraid to be too ‘modern’ or ‘international’ and not ‘national’ or ‘imperial’ enough, I was left in 
peace, perhaps because I demanded so little recognition. In the eyes of the Grand Inquisitors of Italian art, I 
remained but a provincial professor of etching at the Fine Arts Academy of Bologna.” (Reported in the article “Art 
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pressures also means that peripheral agents are likely to suffer a legitimacy denial due to their 
departure from evaluators’ normative expectations and standards. In addition, peripheral agents 
usually have only limited ability to mobilize attention from within their own field. As Collins 
(2004: 436) noted, “[…] a peripheral position condemns one to coming too late into the 
sophisticated centre of the action.” As individual agents progress towards the core and therefore 
become more embedded within the field’s social structure, deviant ideas are foreclosed and 
adherence to the field’s institutionalized norms and standards is increasingly stimulated and even 
rewarded. But proximity to the core also implies greater leverage to elicit attention from relevant 
evaluators. Thus, not only are core agents more likely to produce work that adheres to norms and 
standards that reflect evaluators’ beliefs and preferences, but they also have superior access to 
the material and symbolic resources they need to further their work.  
Following the above arguments, it is plausible to expect evaluators to exhibit a systematic 
tendency to favor core players relative to peripheral ones when relinquishing symbolic and 
material resources. This prediction appears especially warranted insofar as evaluators have 
strong, uniform incentives to enforce established norms and standards of evaluation and thereby 
preserve the institutional logics of their field. For example, this is likely the case when evaluators 
are peers from the same community.2 In fact, not only are peer evaluators likely to have vested 
interests in preserving the status quo but also to use their influence to protect it. Sociologists of 
art and science have provided extensive evidence about peer resistance (White and White, 1965; 
                                                                                                                                                             
View; Giorgio Morandi: A Quality of Private Mediation” by Hilton Kramer, The New York Times, December 6, 
1981). 
2
 The assertion that peer evaluators allocate conservatively resources and recognition is recurrent but not absolute. 
Because these individuals are often high status members of their professional community they may have significant 
degree of latitude in endorsing deviant ideas without worrying too much about being penalized for their 
unconventional choices. Evidence consistent with this idea can be found in Phillips and Zuckerman (2001). It should 
be noted, however, that the question of whether high status favors or hinders departure from established norms and 
standards is still open and competing perspectives have been offered on this matter (for a recent discussion see in 
particular Phillips, Turco and Zuckerman, 2010). 
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Merton, 1968). As an example of this dynamic, consider the French Academy of Fine Arts 
(Académie des Beaux Arts) in the 19th century. The French Academy assessed artwork and 
rewarded artists based on the evaluation of gatekeepers, who were members of the Academy. 
Success in the system depended upon receiving recognition from the Academy. In theory, the 
work by the artist was evaluated objectively; in practice, the gatekeepers increasingly attempted 
to maintain their own power and that of their followers. As a result, artists associated with 
Academy members were more likely to win awards. Over the years, the members of the 
Academy took turns obtaining symbolic rewards for their own students, thus effectively assuring 
the continuity of the Academy’s orthodoxy (White and White, 1965).  
In science, medical specialists have a long history of resisting inventions from what they 
define as ‘the outside’: Pasteur, for instance, faced violent resistance from contemporary medical 
specialists when he advanced his germ theory. He regretted that he was not a medical specialist, 
who he felt regarding himself as a ‘mere’ chemist poaching on their scientific preserves, and thus 
not worthy of their attention (Olmsted and Fulton, 2008). In addition, when evaluators are peers, 
agents who are positioned at the core of a given field’s social structure are more likely to share 
particular cognitive and social networks with them, resulting in a strong bias towards work 
emanating from the core. This effect has been documented in academic evaluation systems 
where evaluators are typically established scholars who inevitably “have students, colleagues, 
and friends with whom they share what is often a fairly small cognitive universe and they are 
frequently asked to adjudicate the work of individuals with whom they have only a few degrees 
of separation … Evaluators [therefore] often favour their own type of research while being 
firmly committed to rewarding the strongest proposal” (Lamont, 2009: 8). 
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The previous arguments suggest the existence of a socially structured ordering of 
creativity whereby a disproportionate amount of symbolic and material resources accrue to those 
at the core of the social field. They point, in other words, to a misallocation of recognition as 
predicated by the notion of cumulative advantage and disadvantage, known in science as “the 
Matthew effect” – the tendency for eminent scientists to receive disproportionate credit for their 
work compared to comparable scientific contributions by relatively unknown scientists (Merton, 
1968).3 While the Matthew effect implies the existence of a social stratification in science that 
translates into a de facto hierarchical structure based on reputation (whereby eminent scientists 
stay at the top of the ‘pyramid’ and unknown ones at its bottom), the distinction between core 
and peripheral agents instead depends on their degree of embeddedness within the social field 
and, by implication, the extent to which they tend to conform as well as their ability to leverage 
social network resources to enhance visibility. In light of the previous considerations, we thus 
argue that evaluators who are industry peers tend to reproduce dominant social beliefs and 
norms, and hence are more likely to grant recognition to core as opposed to peripheral members 
of a given field’s the social network. 
 
SETTING AND DATA 
Our analysis is situated within the context of the Hollywood film industry. This is a very 
promising setting to study the relationship between social structure, peers’ evaluation and 
rewards for creativity. First, as we noted before, creativity is central to the film production 
process, since each movie is a unique product this requires the collaborative work of cast and 
                                                 
3
 This perspective echoes Collins’ concern: “Are we dealing only with fame, not with creativity itself?” (1998: 61). 
Collins effectively questions why there have been many creative individuals who were “buried in obscurity” (1998: 
61) because they never received credit for their works: “This is a powerful image because it sustains most of us 
intellectuals, who rarely get the credit we think we deserve” (ibid.). 
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crew members. These diverse contributions are both so individualized in terms of their 
specialization, and so essential to a movie’s success, that special honors (e.g., the Academy 
Awards) have been established to recognize those contributors whose work is judged to be 
noteworthy in each specialty (Simonton, 2004b). Thus, this is an industry that allows us to study 
simultaneously the peers who evaluate and the individual agents who compete with one another 
for their approval. In this industry context, the results of these evaluations are made (very) public 
every year through the conferring of prestigious awards that celebrate outstanding cinematic 
achievements, which establish a level of social validation in the field unachievable by other 
means (Simonton, 2004a, 2004b; Cattani and Ferriani, 2008).  
Our data consist of the population of crew and cast members (hereafter ‘professionals’) 
who worked on at least one of the 2,297 movies distributed in the United States by the 8 major 
studios – i.e., the seven historical majors plus the more recently founded (1994) Dreamworks – 
and their various subsidiaries over the twelve-year-period 1992-2004. We collected information 
on the composition of the production team of each movie in the sample, as well as the level of 
recognition their creative work on each movie had gained by recording the awards and 
nominations each professionals’ work had received from several award-granting organizations. 
While movie-making is essentially a collaborative venture – the list of “credits” at the close of 
any move shows the wealth of individuals who contribute their creative input, unique talents and 
technical expertise to each project – only a very restricted group of people is normally credited 
(in terms of awards) with the critical creative work. Our analysis focused on the following set of 
professionals: producer, director, writer, leading actor/actress, editor, cinematographer, 
production designer and composer. Using the Internet Movie Database we then identified 12,679 
of these ‘critical creators’ as distributed across these 8 roles in the movies in our dataset. 
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Finally, to unveil the socio-relational fabric of the industry we analyzed the bipartite 
affiliation network between professionals and movies. An affiliation network is a network of 
vertices connected by common group memberships such as projects, teams or organizations. We 
thus constructed networks of film professionals in which a link between any two professionals 
indicates collaboration on the making of a movie. In the global network, professionals are 
directly connected to each other when they worked on the same movie project, and indirectly 
when they are linked through at least one professional who worked on two or more movies4. We 
used a three-year moving window to control for the duration of each tie, hence making the 
adjacency matrixes time-varying (but the results are qualitatively similar when different time 
windows – e.g., a two- or four-year window – are used in the analysis). We started with the core 
crewmembers that worked in 1995 and used the earlier three-year data to construct the 
accumulative relational profiles. We then used the resulting ten time-varying matrices to 
compute all individual level network measures.  
 
VARIABLES 
Dependent Variable 
We used a discrete-choice approach to model the industry’s peer-agent evaluation process, in 
which peer evaluators select agents’ work by bestowing an award or nomination. In this context, 
the evaluators are the following peer-based awarding organizations: the Academy of Motion 
Picture Arts & Sciences, the Producers Guild of America, the Directors Guild of America, the 
Writers Guild of America, the Screen Actors Guild, the Art Directors Guild, the American 
                                                 
4
 The affiliation network was therefore created starting from an individual-by-movie matrix X where xij = 1 if the ith 
individual participated in making the jth movie, and xij = 0 otherwise. We then multiplied matrix X and its transpose 
X', whose ijth cell indicates the number of movies to which both professional i and professional j contributed. This 
value can be interpreted as an index of the strength of social proximity between the two individuals (Borgatti and 
Everett, 1997). 
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Society of Cinematographers, the American Cinema Editors, and the Film Independent 
(originally Independent Feature Project/West). We collected data on the accolades awarded by 
them in each year.5 The primary data sources were Tom O’Neil’s (2003) Movie Awards and the 
organization’s official web sites. The dependent variable thus takes the value 1 when in a given 
year a professional receives one award/nomination from one of the previous awarding 
organizations, and 0 otherwise. 
 
Independent Variable 
In order to detect the core-periphery structure in our data we followed the procedure 
implemented in UCINET (Borgatti, Everett and Freeman, 2002) using a genetic algorithm. The 
definition of the core is here a group of nodes that are connected to all other nodes of the core 
and the periphery. The periphery is defined a group of nodes that are not connected to each other 
but only to the nodes in the core. The algorithm is designed to maximize the density within the 
core (between the regions belonging to the core) and to minimize the density within the 
periphery (in an ideal core-periphery structure there are zero relations between the peripheral 
nodes). Since the density of the core-periphery interaction has no ideal value, these observations 
are treated as missing (see Appendix for the formalized version of this algorithm). Using this 
procedure we created the binary variable Individual Core-Periphery – which takes on the value 1 
when individuals are partitioned into the core and 0 for those who are partitioned into the 
periphery of the Hollywood network. We created this variable adopting a 3-year moving 
                                                 
5
 We focused on these organizations for various reasons. All have been in existence for several years, are widely 
regarded as reliable and competent organizations. As Gemser et al. (2008: 31) noticed, “[...] the announcements of 
the winners of all these awards receive national coverage in the printed press and/or on national television, and the 
jury process is transparent for the outside world.” Together, the selected awards reflect the judgments of hundreds of 
interested expert peers from the worlds of film practice in identifying and rewarding exceptional film-making 
achievement. The range of awards used in the analysis allow us to minimize the risk of including only awards – e.g., 
Oscars – whose assignment is sometimes driven by commercial considerations (Holbrook, 1999). 
 11
window, i.e., for the three years (t-3, t-2 and t-1) prior to the focal year t (the results do not vary 
much using a different time window). The measure was computed using UCINET VI (Borgatti, 
Everett and Freeman, 2002).6  
 
Control Variables 
To rule out possible alternative explanations for the hypothesized relationships we included 
several control variables in the final model specification. 
Team Reputation. An individual’s status stems from both their past achievements and the 
status of their partners, and they can receive greater recognition by collaborating with higher-
status colleagues. This implies that “higher status affiliations help to increase returns to a given 
quality of output” (Benjamin and Podolny, 1999: 565). We accounted for these possibilities by 
measuring the quality of the team as the average number of accolades team members other than 
the focal individual had received in the three years (i.e., t-1, t-2, and t-3) prior to the focal year t. 
Individual Role. As noted above, our analysis is focused on a restricted group of 
professional roles, and, because each one embodies different artistic and technical dimensions 
and draws on diverse cognitive and practical abilities, the assumption that the same relational 
mechanisms are equally important across different roles might be inappropriate. Controlling for 
role is also important because different organizations bestow awards in different role categories, 
and the number of these has changed over time in some cases. While the Academy of Motion 
Picture Arts and Sciences and Film Independent tend to assign awards to all (or most) categories 
(thus covering all roles in the analysis), the various guilds only award their members. As a result, 
individuals performing roles with more award categories have greater chances of receiving 
                                                 
6
 It is worth noting that while all agents in the core are highly central as calculated by virtually any measure, not 
every set of central agents forms a core. Indeed, they “may have high centrality by being strongly connected to 
different cohesive regions of the graph and need not have any ties to each other” (Borgatti and Everett, 1999: 393).  
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accolades for their creative work. We accounted for this possibility and professionals’ particular 
roles by including a fixed effect for the role each professional performed in a given movie. This 
was achieved in SAS using the STRATA statement which considers each role as a separate 
stratum – i.e., grouping all observations for each role in the process of constructing the likelihood 
function. When the same professional covered multiple roles in the same movie or across 
different movies, the attribution was based on the role s/he undertook most often during the study 
period. 
Individual Degree of Control. Prior research has shown how intrinsic motivation is more 
conducive to creativity than extrinsic motivation (Amabile, 1996). When the primary 
motivations are interest in and enjoyment of an activity, outputs tend to be more creative than 
when the motivation is achieving goals set by others. It is thus quite possible that individuals 
performing multiple roles also have more freedom in the pursuit of their goals and are in a better 
position to express their skills and talents. As a result of being more intrinsically motivated they 
are more likely to generate creative work and even increase their visibility in the field. We 
therefore created the variable Individual Degree of Control to capture the extent to which 
professionals enjoy enough latitude to express their creativity, by measuring the average number 
of different roles each performed in their movies in a given year. While in most cases there was 
only one specialist per role, a professional sometimes performed multiple roles in a single movie 
(e.g., Clint Eastwood was director, actor and producer for Unforgiven in 1992) or the same role 
was collectively performed by multiple individuals (e.g., Joel and Ethan Cohen co-directed 
Fargo in 1996). 
Individual Artistic Reputation. Peers’ judgments are influenced by agents’ past 
achievements (Podolny, 1993): a high number of accolades in an individual’s career would 
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probably indicate an exceptional talent and skills. Past research in the film industry also suggests 
that the most successful professionals often enjoy preferential access to better resources and 
information (Faulkner and Anderson, 1987). Since recognition through accolades is highly 
valued by industry members, recipients enjoy greater media attention than their lower-status 
counterparts (Hsu, 2005). Accordingly, we controlled for an individual professional’s talent and 
skills by creating the variable Individual Artistic Reputation, i.e., the number of awards won and 
nominations gained by each professional in the three years (i.e., t-3, t-2, and t-1) prior to the 
focal year t (again, the results did not change with a different time window). 
Individual Commercial Reputation. Following previous research (e.g., Elberse, 2007), 
we looked at a professional’s commercial reputation based on how well or poorly their movies 
had fared commercially. Specifically, we computed the cumulative number of ‘top 10 box office’ 
movies in each year in which each professional worked until the year prior to the focal one using 
data on top-grossing movies from the IMDB online database. We chose the number of ‘top 10 
box office’ movies in a given year to have a conservative measure of each professional’s 
commercial reputation. But the results are qualitatively similar when the top 20 or top 30 box 
office movies are used. 
Movie Sequel. The extent to which movies reflect a genuine search for artistic novelty or 
focus instead on more formulaic content (which one could say was the case with sequels), might 
affect the likelihood of a professional receiving an accolade. This variable was thus computed as 
a dummy, taking the value 1 when a movie was a sequel and 0 otherwise. 
Movie Rating. Another important factor in measuring the level of creativity inherent in a 
particular movie is the rating assigned by the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA). 
Ratings signal the degree of sexually graphic sequences, violence and strong language in a 
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movie. Prior research suggests that features produced for mature audiences (R and NC-17) 
perform less well at the box office (Ravid, 1999). Movies rated G, PG and PG-13 have greater 
audience potential, and indeed movie theater’s landlords may sometimes contractually prohibit 
them from showing NC-17 films. As a result studios quite often exert some pressure on 
producers and directors to ensure films receive a rating aligned with their market aspirations. 
This practice can obviously constrain creativity. We accounted for this by including a categorical 
variable with six categories: G, PG, PG-13, R, NC-17, and no available rating. 
Movie Genre. The likelihood of an accolade being bestowed could also depend on movie 
genre, on the premise that a movie’s artistic content might vary across genres: one could argue 
that a professional working on an action movie is less likely to gain such recognition, as action 
movies typically reflect more formulaic conventions. We created a categorical variable (with 18 
categories) to control for each movie’s genre using data from the American Film Institute (AFI). 
Number of Movies. The chance of receiving an award or nomination is also likely to 
depend on the number of movie each professional makes in a given year. Also, as they make 
more movies, the very same professionals can expand the number of ties to other professionals in 
the industry, which in turn can affect the chance of receiving an award or a nomination. 
Accordingly, we controlled for the number of movie a professional was involved in during the 
focal year. 
Awarding Organizations. We accounted for the impact of stable unobserved differences 
between the selected groups of peer evaluators by stratifying by awarding organizations, which is 
tantamount to estimating a fixed effects model for awarding organizations.  
Year. Since we had no a priori expectations about the existence of time trend(s) over the 
study period, we controlled for the effect of all unobserved factors (e.g., macro-economic trends, 
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changes in taste or fashion, and other factors that might affect the movie industry) that might 
affect peers’ evaluation by also stratifying by year.  
 
MODEL 
For any given role, we modeled the impact of a professional’s characteristics on the probability 
of  a peer-based awarding organization bestowing an accolade on that professional rather than 
any other. This can be framed as a series of discrete choice problems with one professional 
selected in each category (role) each year from a discrete set of professionals. Let yij be equal to 
1 if awarding organization i (with i = 1, ... , n) chooses option j (with j= 1,... , Ji), 0 otherwise; 
and xij be a vector of explanatory variables describing option j for awarding organization i. The 
number of possible choices is Ji to indicate that different peer-based awarding organizations may 
have different sets of options to choose from. The conditional logit model introduced by 
McFadden assumes the following general form: 
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[a] 
This equation implies that the odds awarding organization i will choose professional j over 
professional k is given by the difference in the vector of explanatory variables describing each 
option as 
exp{β(xij – xik)} 
[b] 
If the values of any explanatory variable are the same, then this variable has no effect on the 
choice between professional j and professional k. Suppose that awarding organization i has a 
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stable preference for each option j, denoted µij, and that the actual utility Uij for a particular option 
varies randomly around µij so that  
Uij = µij + εij 
[c] 
where εij is a random variable having a standard extreme value distribution and the εij’s are 
independent across the different options. If an awarding organization chooses the option with the 
highest utility Uij and if the logarithm of µij is a linear function of the explanatory variables, then the 
probability that awarding organization i chooses option j is given by equation [a]7.  
 
RESULTS 
Tables 1 and 2 present the descriptive statistics and the correlation values, which are relatively 
low. We also checked for the existence of multicollinearity by computing the variance inflation 
factors (VIFs) using PROC REG in SAS, and found it was not a problem. As mentioned before, 
we estimated these models by stratifying by organization, role and year. 
Table 3 presents the coefficient estimates for the discrete choice models predicting the 
likelihood that peer organizations will choose to give an accolade. Model 1 is the baseline model 
with all controls. Although the coefficient estimates are not reported, the overall impact of the 
dummies for movie genre and movie rating are significant. The coefficient estimate of the 
                                                 
7
 If these conditions are satisfied, the conditional logit model is reasonable because the assumption of the 
‘independence of irrelevant alternatives’ (IIA), a key assumption of the discrete choice model, is not violated 
(Allison, 1999). This means that the odds of choosing option j rather than option k are not affected by the other 
available options. The IIA assumption can only be tested when awarding organizations are presented with different 
choices. In our context, it is reasonable to assume IIA because “nominees are unlikely to be considered close 
substitutes for one another” (Pardoe and Simonton, 2007: 381). A possible exception to IIA might be the relatively 
rare occasion when a professional receives multiple nominations in the same category in the same year. In the case 
of Oscars, for example, this has happened only very rarely – e.g., for Best Director (Clarence Brown in 1930, 
Michael Curtiz in 1938, and Steven Soderbergh in 2000) – because “[…] the Oscar rules prevent this from 
happening in the lead acting categories” (Pardoe and Simonton, 2007: 381-392). Similar considerations hold for 
other awards as well. In the analysis, we stratified by awarding organization, professional’s role and year. We 
estimated the conditional logit model by maximum likelihood using PROC LOGISTIC in SAS (version 9.1). 
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variable Movie Sequel is significant, and the sign of the coefficient is in the expected direction, 
showing that the professionals working in movies that are more formulaic are less likely to 
receive an accolade. Professionals working in a team whose members received accolades in 
previous years (Team Reputation) are more likely to receive themselves an accolade, a result 
consistent with findings from Esparza et al. (2010). At the individual level, the quality of each 
professional’s human capital (Individual Artistic Reputation) and the number of roles each 
professional performed in the same movie (Individual Degree of Control) turned out to be 
significant and in the postulated direction. Similarly, professionals whose status stems from  
having worked in the past in commercially successful movies (Individual Commercial 
Reputation) was significant, suggesting they enjoy greater visibility and therefore are more likely 
to receive an accolade. By contrast, when professionals work on more than one movie per year 
(Individual Number of Movies) the likelihood they will receive an accolade declines, possibly 
because the quality of their performance deteriorates as they get involved in too many projects. 
The global test of the null hypothesis that all the coefficients are equal to 0 is highly statistically 
significant (the likelihood ratio test is 1982.23 with 27 df and Pr>ChiSq = 0.0001). 
Model 2 shows the results after we entered our variable of central theoretical interest, i.e., 
Individual Core-periphery. The coefficient (0.793) is in the hypothesized direction and is 
statistically significant (p<0.001), either by a Wald test or a likelihood ratio test.  The odds ratio 
of exp(0.793) = 2.21 indicates that core professionals have an odds of receiving an accolade that 
is more than double the odds of those in the periphery. Also, all the control variables are 
significant and the signs of their coefficients remain unchanged relative to the baseline.  
A potential problem in the analysis is that the likelihood of being rewarded by peers 
might affect a professional’s position in the core or the periphery of the field. At a general level, 
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we believe that the way we constructed the core-periphery measure makes it unlikely that our 
results are driven simply by reverse causation. For a professional in a given year, the core-
periphery measure is constructed from affiliation data for the three preceding years. Creative 
performance is then taken as the award bestowed in the focal year. Thus, we relate individuals’ 
likelihood of being consecrated to their past network position.  
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Over the past 20 years increasing sociological evidence has accumulated suggesting that 
creativity is very often embedded within broader social structures that shape access to both novel 
ideas and social support. Creative achievements in fields as diverse as science, art and business 
all exhibit a very similar pattern, in that ‘creators’ are embedded in a network of actors who 
share ideas and act as both critics and supporters of each other’s work (Collins, 1998; Simonton, 
1999; Uzzi and Spiro, 2005). These accounts do not deny the role of individual talents and/or 
dispositions; but they suggest that these qualities are mobilized and channelled into a context of 
intersecting relationships through which conventions are learned and ideas recombined. The 
present study has expanded upon this line of work by establishing a framework for understanding 
creativity as a joint result of socio-structural conditions at the individual level and social systems 
making judgments about individuals’ efforts.  
Building on socio-institutional perspectives on creativity (Csikszentmihályi, 1996; Ford, 
1996) and combining structural explanations of creativity with recent organizational insights on 
the social structure of consensus (Cattani, Ferriani, Negro and Perretti, 2008), we framed the 
relationship between novelty and its recognition as an ongoing tension between the core and 
periphery of the social field. We also noted that whether these creative efforts are socially 
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validated, and therefore rewarded, depends on the norms and standards of judgment used by 
relevant evaluators, which in turn reflect evaluators’ incentives to preserve the institutional 
logics of the field. We reasoned that individuals positioned closer to the core of their field are 
more likely to appeal to peer evaluators because closeness to the core induces adherence to the 
prevailing field’s norms and standards.  
Our results suggest that rewards for creativity are socially structured: where individuals 
stand within the field’s social structure may affect the recognition of their work and thus shape 
their reputation for creativity. This is an important finding that complements the vast research 
that has treated individual abilities as the main explanation for the production of creative work 
(Sternberg, 1985; Gardner, 1993). As a result, little attention has been devoted to how creativity 
is shaped by a wider set of constraints that operate via social validation and are enforced by 
external evaluators. This paper shows how creativity is embedded in patterns of relationships and 
judged by evaluators (gatekeepers) that participate in the social stratification of the field by 
granting or denying recognition to individuals’ creative work. Also, by focusing on peer 
evaluators and socio-structural conditions affecting the process of validation, our study extends 
research on the determinants of social stratification which tends to focus on agents (e.g., 
individuals, organizations) vying for recognition rather than the gatekeepers responsible for 
conferring it. Research on the social structure of markets, for instance, has predominantly looked 
at attributes such as the position in the status ordering of market actors and its effect on the 
opportunities available to them (Podolny, 1994; Benjamin and Podolny, 1999). On the other 
hand, drawing from the audience-candidate framework (Zuckerman, 1999), organizational 
ecologists have only recently started to explicitly incorporate audience (evaluator) level features 
 20
and variables in their models of organizational survival (Hsu and Hannan, 2005; Hannan, Pólos 
and Carroll, 2007). 
Our research contributes to this line of inquiry by establishing a theoretical and empirical 
framework for better appreciating the implications that peer evaluators may bear on the 
distribution of rewards to individual agents, independent of agents’ specific attributes. Our 
findings thus enhance current understanding of competitive dynamics in markets by highlighting 
the influence of agents’ position in the social structure on their ability to establish themselves as 
legitimate players in the market. The finding that there is a significant relationship between 
individuals’ position in the social structure and their likelihood of appealing to relevant peers 
provides considerable empirical substance to Merton’s (1968) central claim that in order to 
investigate the processes shaping the advancement of knowledge in a given field, it is important 
to consider the social mechanisms that curb or facilitate the incorporation of possible 
contributions into the domain.  
Based on our theoretical framework, individuals who are routinely peripheral to the field 
and therefore not deeply (if at all) assimilated into existing norms and standards will struggle to 
achieve symbolic and material resources for their creative efforts. This is typically the case, for 
instance, of mavericks in the art world. Unlike core individuals who are tied to the field’s centre 
of influence and therefore likely to follow more conventional perspectives in their work, 
mavericks retain some loose connection with their field “but no longer participate in its activities 
… They propose innovations the art world refuses to accept as within the limits of what it 
ordinarily produces” (Becker, 1982: 233). As an illustration consider iconic film director Stanley 
Kubrick’s decision to reject the production logics of the Hollywood establishment (which he 
referred to as “film by fiat, film by frenzy”) and move to a secluded town in England in 1962, 
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despite the success of his last Hollywood production Spartacus (Ciment, 2003). Frustrated by the 
lack of creative freedom in Hollywood, he established his own independent production company 
in the UK. Film historians and critics now concur that Kubrick’s cinematic creativity benefited 
from his radical decision as he started to explore themes and ideas that were far removed from 
Hollywood’s prevailing canons, yet he also suffered a significant legitimacy discount for 
standing outside the establishment, which never granted him an Academy Award for best picture 
or director. These ideas are also consistent with Kuhn’s (1970) argument that exponents of a 
dominant paradigm often will counter fundamental novelties, which typically originate from the 
periphery of the field, because they are subversive and pose a challenge to the existing paradigm. 
Clearly, these processes of social selection that regulate the allocation of rewards can counter 
efforts to introduce new ideas and practices that do not conform to the dominant conventions. 
They also raise the broader question of how change is triggered in an established institutional 
field when new ideas and practices, once introduced, challenge the position of established 
participants (Leblebici et al., 1991). This is a fundamental question which merits further 
investigation.   
The study suffers from obvious limitations that nevertheless represent opportunities for 
future research. First, we studied an art field rather than a scientific one where knowledge can be 
more easily codified and evaluation of changes is likely to be premised more on technical criteria 
than on the fit with normative criteria (Becker, 1982). As a consequence, the results should be 
generalized with caution to other settings where external evaluations might be related more 
closely to technical prowess and mastery. Also, it is important to stress how, from our data, we 
can only observe evaluators’ choice – the awarding of an accolade – but not the process leading 
to the final choice. The complex process by which evaluators screen and select falls outside the 
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scope of this study. A different research design and analytical approach (e.g., an ethnographic 
study or a survey) would be better suited to address this question explicitly. Finally, we looked 
only at peer evaluators who are likely to have a vested interest in preserving existing institutional 
field arrangements and therefore oppose attempts to challenge or depart from them. Focusing on 
critics might however offer a completely different picture. Critics and peers have in fact different 
incentives, in that critics’ reputation within the field depends significantly on their ability to 
discover new talents. The role of critics and, more generally, of different kinds of evaluators in 
creating countervailing mechanisms that may curb the socio-structural ordering of creativity is an 
important area of research that deserves future attention. For instance, contexts such as the 
Cannes Film Festival and the Venice Film Festival, where the composition of juries in terms of 
peers and critics has varied dramatically over their long history, provide exciting empirical 
settings for further exploring and extending the ideas developed here.   
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Table 1  
Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
Variable 
 
Mean 
 
Std Dev 
 
Min 
 
Max 
 
 
Audience (stratifying variable)   1 8 
Role (stratifying variable)   1 8 
Year (stratifying variable)   1992 2004 
Movie Genre (categorical)   1 18 
Movie Rating (categorical)   0 5 
Movie Sequel 0.098 0.298 0 1 
Team Reputation 0.548 1.048 0 16.417 
Individual Degree of Control 1.202 0.562 1 7 
Individual Commercial Reputation 0.351 0.896 0 12 
Individual Artistic Reputation 0.095 0.358 0 9 
Individual Number of Movies 1.580 1.026 1 15 
Individual Core-periphery 
 
0.004 
 
0.065 
 
0 
 
1 
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Table 2  
Pearson Correlation Coefficients* 
 
Variable 
 
1 
 
2 
 
3 
 
4 
 
5 
 
6 
 
7 
 
 
       
1. Movie Sequel 1       
  
       
2. Team Reputation 0.023 1      
  
       
3. Individual Degree of Control -0.018 0.094 1     
  
       
4. Individual  Commercial 
Reputation -0.038 0.199 0.022 1    
  
       
5. Individual Artistic Reputation 0.020 0.238 0.091 0.158 1   
  
       
6. Individual Number of Movies (0.000) 0.085 0.518 0.261 0.085 1  
         
7. Individual Core-periphery -0.055 0.041 0.171 0.081 0.027 0.260 1 
  
       
        
All correlations significant at the <.001 level  with the only exception of the correlation reported in parenthesis 
(not significant).  
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Table 3 
Results for Discrete Choice Model Predicting Peers’ Choice 
 
  Model 1 
 
Model 2 
 
Variables 
 Coeff. Std. Err.  
 
Coeff. 
 
Std. Err. 
 
Movie Genre (dummies)  included  --  included  -- 
Movie Rating (dummies)  included --  included  -- 
Movie Sequel (dummy) -0.721** 0.144 -0.768** 0.146 
Team Reputation 0.196** 0.015 0.195** 0.015 
Individual Degree of Control 0.386** 0.050 0.396** 0.050 
Individual Commercial 
Reputation 0.171** 0.022 0.169** 0.022 
Individual Artistic Reputation 0.387** 0.039 0.383** 0.040 
Individual Number of Movies -0.135** 0.032 -0.156** 0.032 
Individual Core-periphery    0.793**  0.251 
        
Fixed Effects:     
Awarding Organization  included  included  
Year included  included  
Individual Role included  included  
 
    
ChiSq vs null 1982.23**  1990.98**  
ChiSq vs Model 1    18.18**  
Number of Strata 266  266  
Number of Observations 
 
82594 
   
82594 
   
 
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01 – Two-tailed tests for all variables 
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APPENDIX  
 
The core/periphery algorithm 
The discrete version of the core-periphery algorithm is formalized by Borgatti and 
Everett (1999) as 
∑=
ij
ijijδαρ   )1(  
otherwise.
0
1
)2( PERIPHERYcandPERIPHERYcif
COREcandCOREcif
ji
ji
ij ==
==
=δ  
 
where ρ is a measure for the correlation between the real network structure and the 
theoretical structure, which is maximized if A (the matrix of aij) and ∆ (the matrix of iδ ij) 
are the same. In the equations, aij indicates the presence or absence of a relation between 
actor i and j, ci refers to the group (core or periphery) actor i belongs to and iδ ij 
indicates the presence or absence of a relation between actor i and j in the ideal image. 
In the equations, ijα indicates the presence or absence of a relation between actor i and j 
in the observed data, ci refers to the group (core or periphery) actor i belongs and δij 
indicates the presence or absence of a relation between actor i and j in the ideal core-
periphery image. Where ρ is a measure for the correspondence between the real network 
structure and the theoretical structure, which is maximized if A (the matrix of aij) and ∆ 
(the matrix of δij) are the same. Note that “.” indicates a missing value. The reason is 
that off-diagonal regions (core-to-periphery ties and periphery-to-core) of the ideal core-
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periphery matrix are treated as missing data: the genetic algorithm thus seeks only to 
maximize density in the core and minimize density in the periphery, without regard to the 
density of ties between those off-diagonal regions. The genetic algorithm is designed to 
find the core-periphery partition that maximizes the fit statistic (ρ). The partition obtained 
by applying model (2) to our data then places the various actors either in the core or the 
periphery. 
 
 
